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Amakwerekwere, is an informal term used by South Africans to identify African 
foreigners. This is an increasingly popular term in post-Apartheid South Africa, 
primarily because there has been an apparent increase in foreign Africans 
entering South Africa. The assumption is that African entering South Africa are 
somehow coming because they want to take part in the recent democratization 
and new freedoms of South Africa. In May of 2008, there was an outbreak of 
violence that started in the township of Alexandra in Johannesburg and spread to 
other regions of South Africa. The violence was deemed a facet of a trend in 
xenophobic attacks. However, no sufficient evidence has been provided to 
indicate that there is direct causality between the violence and anti-foreigner 
sentiment in the country. In fact, it has become sufficient simply to provide 
evidence of anti-foreigner or xenophobic sentiment. This inquiry seeks to 
investigate the ways in which xenophobic violence has been understood in post-
Apartheid South Africa, and how legal and political assumptions regarding ‘rights’ 
and democratization have been an impediment to improving the social realities of 
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“After climbing a great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb.” 
- Nelson Mandela 
 
 The wisdom of former President Nelson Mandela has never been truer for 
South Africa. As I write, South Africa is about seventeen years into post-
Apartheid democracy. No one would refute that this nation has made strides, 
from the Boer Wars of the late 1800s, to the founding of the union in the early 
1900s, the inception of the Apartheid regime and it’s dismantling, and now the 
reign of former leaders of the anti-Apartheid movement - the ANC. However, 
after such progress unfavorable realities remain: unemployment is hovering 
around twenty-five percent, fifty-percent of the population lives below the poverty 
line, access to education remains a challenge for much of the population, and 
there is a proliferation urban poverty. The objectives of the Reconstruction and 
Development Acts, which were meant to provide opportunities for South Africans, 
have been feckless. Instead, an echoing of disparity amongst the people of 
South Africa persists. Finally, but not in any bit less significant, is the reality of 
violence. Much of this violence has been claimed to be the result of xenophobic 
attitudes in the South African population.  
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 Xenophobia – generally understood as an intense irrational hatred or fear of 
foreigners – has, in recent years, been the misfortune for many immigrants 
entering South Africa. For weeks this violence pervaded the major metropolitan 
areas of South Africa and the areas surrounding them. The violence included 
looting, homicides, and rape of those believed to be foreigners.  
 The objective of this inquiry is to investigate the assumption that there is 
direct causality between xenophobic sentiment and the recently occurring 
violence within South Africa. This chapter will provide a brief overview of the 
advent and demise of the Apartheid era. Following this will be a discussion of the 
‘paradox of democratization’ and the limitations of attempting to rectify the 
wrongs of Apartheid through allotting ‘rights’. Then, there will be an investigation 
into migrant life and existing explanations for xenophobic violence. 
A Brief History of Apartheid  
 The Apartheid regime begins with the domination of the National Party in 
politics in the Union of South Africa in 1948.1 Policies toward Africans preceding 
this era were heavily segregationist; however, in the Apartheid era segregationist 
policies are expanded in order to prevent Africans from participating in South 
Africa politically and economically. One of the first major steps of the South 
African government was the transformation from a dominion state of Great Britain 
into a republic in 1961.2 This occurrence ceased ties with Britain and resulted in 
the Republic of South Africa. Accompanying the new governmental structure was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Thompson, 187 
2 ibid, 188 
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a new system of representation in which Africans were required to elect a white 
representative to advocate their interests to the legislature.3 
 Furthermore, Africans were moved out into separate areas called 
homelands and only allowed to participate in the economy of South Africa as 
migrant labor.4 Migrant labor will be explored in more detailing in the following 
chapter, but African movement (both native and non-native) in the urban areas of 
South Africans were restricted primarily to working as contract labor migrants. 
Contracts were notably more infrequent for native migrant laborers than they 
were for non-native migrant laborers. This came about primarily due to labor 
opposition that was occurring in the early years of mining (1910-1948), and was 
incited by labor opposition over wages with Afrikaners. 
 The implementation of Apartheid policies was favorable for Afrikaners 
primarily because they were provided more opportunity to participate 
economically and politically. In some sense this can be understood as the 
unifying of whites, because it was not until 1948 that Afrikaners were allowed 
positions in government, mining, manufacturing, commerce, and finance. 
Afrikaner farmers had received greater support from the government, as long as 
they only provided wage labor opportunities for Africans. This halted 
sharecropping and land rental options for rural Africans.  
 Life for whites in South Africa in this period was comparable to that of 
middle and upper class whites in any industrialized society, notably Europe and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ibid, 190 
4 ibid, 193 
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North America.5 Many owned cars, lived in large suburban homes, and had 
African domestic workers. The government provided schools, hospitals, parks, 
buses and trains, roads, water, electricity, telephones, and drainage and sewage 
systems. This white population was also politically engaged, through a heavily 
monitored press and access to television and radio. They were largely unaware 
of the social realities of non-white populations (Africans, Coloreds, or Asians).  
 Africans in this era were forced into homelands. Homelands were 
essentially a way in which to divide the African population by ethnic groups into 
smaller territories with the hope that they would develop into smaller nation-
states.6 The intensifying of ethnic identities is an essential way in which those in 
power in South Africa attempted to maintain dominance over the African 
population. Strategic attempts to maintain or intensify ethnic fissures amongst the 
African populations are a recurring theme in the way that the British and 
Apartheid rulers maintain dominance. Leonard Thompson finds that intensifying 
ethnic divisions were largely unsuccessful; instead Africans married across these 
ethnic divisions and ignored the government’s attempts to segregate them 
according to ethnic divisions, and in more recent generations simply consider 
themselves African. However, Leonard finds earlier that ethnic divisions have 
never been completely about ethnic identities; instead, they were often about 
which ethnic groups could provide material benefits and protection. Therefore, 
many Africans would choose to follow chiefdoms for reasons other than ethnic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ibid, 200-201	  	  
6 Leach, 74  
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identity.  
 The end of the 1970s was the beginning of an economic decline in South 
Africa that prompted the exodus of many white professionals. The emigration of 
whites made maintaining dominance more difficult because they were largely the 
majority of the skilled laborers in the country, and the African population was not 
able to replace them even if the segregationist policies of Apartheid had been 
repealed. The late 1970s was also a time when South Africa had begun to come 
under significant scrutiny for Apartheid policies. The American Civil Rights 
movement had success at obtaining more political rights for American Blacks, 
and American civil rights activists had begun to advocate on behalf of South 
African Blacks. The next generation of Blacks, Indians, and Coloreds had 
become mobilized against the Apartheid regime. Steve Biko, who was a seminal 
anti-Apartheid activist and martyr, had died in police custody in Pretoria in 1977 
also inciting more frustration and violence from rights activist.  
 Ultimately, this violence culminates in the reality that something must be 
done to stop it. The white supremacist policies had loss much of there legitimacy, 
along with the exodus of whites due to increased violence. Scrutiny from the rest 
of the world, and deep recession had continued to cripple the Apartheid 
government. The Apartheid government was left with no option other than to 
begin negotiations with anti-Apartheid movement leaders from the African 
National Congress (ANC). Leader of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, would have been 
the central figure leading negotiations with the government; however, while in 
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exile his health declined significantly. Because of this Nelson Mandela assumed 
the leadership role of the African National Congress, and led much of the 
negotiations that resulted in the unbanning of the ANC, the repeal of the Native 
Lands Act, the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act, and the 
Separate Amenities Act.7  
 The significance in the reform of the Apartheid regime through legal means 
has placed many issues in the post-Apartheid era in purely legal terms. The 
repealing of the laws listed in the preceding paragraph wwas certainly a feat; 
however, this has failed to significantly ameliorate marginalized rural populations 
from widespread unemployment, inadequate access to services, and has failed 
to provide a better quality of life generally. Today, the government and 
policymakers continue to try and solve the problems of South African society by 
implementing laws and regulations. The post-Apartheid government has only 
been effective at rectifying the challenges of the Apartheid through the 
abstractions of law.  
 
The Challenge of ‘Rights’ and the Paradox of Democratization 
 The 1990s in South Africa were largely a period of transformation. Of the 
changes that have occurred legally, the Aliens Control Act from the Apartheid 
period has remained restrictive. The central underlying assumption has been that 
the democratization of South Africa has prompted an increase in immigrations 
into South Africa. One finding when assessing the reasons for anti-foreigner 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Thompson, 208 
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sentiment in contemporary South Africa is the idea of ‘South African 
exceptionalism’, this is simply the belief that democracy in South Africa has 
resulted in the country as superior to other African nations. The pervasiveness of 
this belief among Black South Africans is a testament to how mythic the end of 
Apartheid was. However, many of the issues that existed during Apartheid 
remain, and the notion that simply proclaiming that one has rights does not 
actualize into a material benefit or even protections.  
 The democratization of South Africa would suggest that a discourse on 
xenophobia might be located in a discussion of nationality. SAMP finds that many 
respondents are divided when it comes to the issue of ‘rights’ for migrants who 
are refugees and asylums seekers. They find: 
- ““South Africans are divided on refugee protection with 47% 
supporting protection and 30% opposed. Nearly 20% have no 
opinion on the matter.” 
- “Nearly three quarters are opposed to increasing the number of 
refugees currently in the country.” 
- “Two thirds are against offering permanent residence to 
refugees who have been in the country for more than 5 years.”	  
- “As many as half favour a policy of requiring all refugees to live 
in border camps. Only 6% strongly opposed.”	  
- “Only 30% agree with allowing refugees to work.”	  
- “And 60% want a policy of mandatory HIV testing of refugees.” 8	  
	  
Therefore, it is apparent that the issue of nationality and who can obtain 
citizenship is imperative for understanding the animosity towards foreigners. 
Nationality is important, not merely for political status, but also for social status. 
The ability of one to access services requires that one is able to have a ‘right’ to 
them by acquiring the nationality, or in the very least legal protections. The SAMP 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Crush, 29 
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survey focuses primarily on refugees and asylum seekers, which is important 
because asylum seekers and refugees are provided a social status that allows 
many of them to claim ‘rights’ to services in South Africa without necessarily 
obtaining nationality. This in particular becomes a problem because service 
delivery in South Africa is often insufficient. This is especially the circumstance in 
rural areas where a relatively substantial proportion of Black South Africans 
continue to reside.  
 However, refugee and asylum seeker status is minor in relation to the size 
of the South African population of fifty million. Therefore, a discussion of ‘rights’ 
has the potential to impede social realities, insomuch as an assessment of social 
realities becomes pervaded by legal and political assumptions. As stated earlier, 
simply having the ability to claim a ‘right’ to something does not necessarily 
manifest into material protections or resources. This is too often the case with 
South Africa, particularly because of issues related to being able to ensure 
resources to everyone in the society. Therefore, nationality does not result in 
actual resources; this is self-evident when investigating the social realities of 
immigrants living in contemporary South Africa. 
 This is ultimately the ‘paradox of democratization’ in South Africa. It is not 
merely that the obtaining of ‘rights’ does not actualize into a material benefit. 
Instead, claiming material benefits becomes more challenging because the 
‘rights’ accompanying nationality presume that there is a basic standard of living 
everyone who is a citizen has. Therefore, the emphasis on the legal status of 
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immigrants in South Africa shifts the focus of government and policymakers from 
rectifying issues following Apartheid. The rights fulfillment of native Africans being 
becomes secondary to the issue of regulating foreigners in this circumstance, 
because the legal assumption is that once they have been endowed with rights to 
a resource the issue has been solved.  
 The Apartheid regime regulated the movement of migrants into and out of 
the country, also seminal to sustaining dominance of the Apartheid regime was 
preventing native Africans from settling in the urban areas of the country. 
Patterns of rural-urban movement within South Africa are under-investigated in 
relations to the distribution of resources, because the legal assumption with the 
repeal of the Lands Act was that rural dwellers would migrate into the urban 
areas to find work. Instead, the rural African population has continued to function 
as migrant labor population, and remaining in these areas has left them 
peripheral and the central problems of deprivation and inadequate service 
delivery, which should be central, become peripheral along with the people and 
the ultimate result is that the most pressing issue becomes xenophobia and the 
victimization of immigrants leads to the emphasis of protecting their ‘rights’.  
Explaining Xenophobic Violence 
 
 Exacerbating the notion that immigrants are a major problem is that rhetoric 
and research from policymakers and academics. Research shifts to focus on 
solutions to society’s latest, most significant social problem, which in this 
instance is: “out of control” immigrations and immigrant’s ‘rights’. One example of 
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what happens in this situation is Lyndith Waller. Waller serves on the South 
African Immigration Advisory Board and has identified illegal (or as she terms it 
“irregular”) migrants as the problem in South Africa. She writes,  
“The most striking feature of deportation statistics is their 
consistency in rankings and growth trends. Mozambicans continue 
to pose the greatest challenge – in 1996 they comprised 87% of all 
deportations – but they have decreased steadily to comprise only 
48.8% in 2004. On the other hand, Zimbabweans – while remaining 
the second greatest challenge – have steadily increased as a 
percentage of the total from 8% in 1996 to 43% by 2004.”9  
 
For her, the statistics provide enough evidence to determine which populations 
pose the greatest threat to South African society. Strikingly, at least from my 
perspective, is that she immediately identifies Zimbabweans and Mozambicans 
as a “challenge”. This completely ignores the history of the presence of these 
populations within South Africa and has no interest in understanding why they 
enter the country; instead, Waller’s interest is singularly that they are the group 
entering irregularly. Following the dominance of immigrants as the central social 
problem for South Africa, anti-foreigner sentiment arises as the new challenge for 
South Africa.  
 However, finding direct causation between xenophobic sentiment and 
violence is challenging, because understanding why someone would commit 
such heinous acts is immensely complicated. Instead, claiming that this violence 
is motivated by xenophobic sentiment has become a matter of simply providing 
evidence that anti-foreigner sentiment is prevalent. Simply making the claim that 
xenophobic sentiment exists does not provide sufficient evidence to suggest 
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  11	  
violence will occur. Deprivation, which is often widely cited as underlying the 
xenophobic sentiment, is widespread throughout South Africa and often does not 
prompt violence. Additionally, a particular type of foreigner is being attacked – 
primarily African foreigner. Therefore, one must consider why this particular 
immigrant group seems to be targeted as oppose to other immigrant groups. An 
important consideration in this case is that by claiming this anti-foreigner 
sentiment is the primary motivation for violent acts presumes that these groups 
are being targeted solely due to their legal status. Logically this raises the 
question of why are other immigrant groups not discriminated against in similar 
ways.  
 Godfrey Mwakkiagile begins “African Immigrants in South Africa” with the 
statement:  
“The xenophobic violence has been perpetrated by Black South 
Africans, prompting some people to describe this phenomenon as 
the new apartheid - by blacks against other blacks - after the end of 
white minority rule.”10 [Mwakkiagile 2008; 7]  
 
This statement makes several suggestions that may or may not be accurate. 
Firstly, the notion that violence is perpetrated solely by Black South Africans is 
problematic insofar as it homogenizes the native Black population of South Africa 
and assumes that there are no ties between native South Africans and other 
Africans. When, in fact, for decades as migrant laborers these groups worked 
together as labor migrants on mines. The diversity within the Black populations of 
South Africa often goes unconsidered. Second, while it is true that White minority 
rule over the political institutions has ended; this does not necessarily mean that 
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they do not continue to influence the political and governmental institutions, 
especially when considering the wealth distribution of South Africa. 
     Employing the analogy of apartheid to explain xenophobic violence 
perpetrated against African immigrant populations is extreme. Apartheid was a 
very structured system of racial and ethnic oppression used by a powerful 
minority population to prevent the dominance of what became a powerless 
majority population. This must not be confused with actions that are being carried 
out by what doesn’t seem to be the entire population of Black South Africans. In 
Jonathan Crush’s study “The Perfect Storm: The Realities of Xenophobia in 
Contemporary South Africa”, he conducts a survey in an attempt to measure the 
level of xenophobic violence in South Africa. One thing Crush measure is the 
likelihood that the respondents of his survey would “take action against foreign 
nationals,” for this question he finds that only 9% of those surveyed would “use 
violence against” foreign nationals.11 [Crush 2006; 38] Therefore, the claim that 
this violence is perpetrated by Black South Africans, generally, is not the entire 
truth.  
     Following the May 2008 attacks, many foreigners were placed in camps to 
protect them from any further persecution and in the immediacy of these attacks 
the South African government shunned such acts. South Africa’s Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSRC) published a policy report -- Violence and 
Xenophobia in South Africa: Developing Consensus, Moving to Action -- 
concluding that the violence was attributable to: 1) competition for jobs, housing, 
and other services; 2) the perception that foreigners were a threat to nationalism; 
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and 3) feelings of superiority of South Africa, as it relates to other Africans.12 
Therefore, the generally accepted stance for the South African government was 
that deprivation motivated violence. HSRC concludes that migrants lived mostly 
in fear following the violence and many of them remained in the temporary 
camps the government set up. 
     In 1999 and 2006, Crush’s surveys found that that xenophobic attitudes 
were high, but noticed that there were increases in these attitudes when 
comparing the data from 2006 with those from 1999.13 However, the increases 
do not appear to be significant. Two features of this survey paralleled with the 
HSRC: 67% and 62% of South Africans believes that foreigners ‘use up 
resources’ and ‘take jobs’, respectively. According to an index created by SAMP 
there is less xenophobia in the provinces Limpopo, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu-
Natal. The three provinces with lower levels of xenophobic sentiment are 
characteristically more rural and a larger proportion of the native African 
population resides in these regions than in the urban areas. Work capturing the 
migrant experience includes in-depth interviews in which migrants identify the 
perpetrators of discrimination as Black South Africans. Migrants mostly reside in 
South Africa’s major cities, particularly Johannesburg, which is the economic 
capital of South Africa. 
     Research conducted on the experience of migrant groups within South 
Africa suggests that perpetual discrimination leaves many with rather bleak 
outlooks for their time in South Africa. Many migrants living in South Africa do not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 HSRC, 32	  
13 Crush, 8 
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intend to stay in the country for very long, but many of them are unable to leave 
because of conflicts in their country of origin, lack of monetary resources to 
return. Additionally, figures from the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees suggest that a substantial proportion of South Africa’s migrant 
populations are refugees and asylum seekers. Perhaps, this reifies the notion 
that entering migrants are exacerbating existing strains on the South African 
economy as proposed by the former Minister of Home Affair. 
     Alan Morris, a sociologist and researcher at Wits University, claims in his 
assessment on the experience of Nigerians and Congolese in South Africa that 
the discrimination of these groups can be attributed to these groups being easily 
identifiable non-native South Africans. Morris’ article draws on interviews in order 
to provide a brief look into the lives of Congolese and Nigerian migrants living in 
South Africa. He contends, from his assessment that members of both of these 
groups experience copious amounts of discrimination and their outlooks for life in 
South Africa were unpromising.14 Morris asks his interviewees if they plan to stay 
in South Africa for a prolonged period of time, and many of them express a 
desire to leave as soon as things in their country of origin are stable and they can 
afford to return. 
     The dominant perception of foreigners, in this case Nigerians and 
Congolese is that they are criminals who are exacerbating the challenges of 
South Africa. Nigerians are stereotyped as drug dealers and drug traffickers. A 
great deal of the animosity surrounding these groups has to do with the idea that 
they are somehow stealing jobs; however, Morris notes that much of this 
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population works in the informal sector and many of them are struggling to find 
work themselves. The belief that foreigners are stealing jobs is also widely held 
according to the survey conducted by SAMP. In 1999, 56% of South Africans 
believed that migrants were taking jobs, this increased to 62% in 2006.15 Perhaps 
this increase was due to the persistence of unemployment. 
     In Morris’ interviews he finds that the three main reasons these groups 
come to South Africa are: job opportunities, opportunities to study, and fear of 
political persecution. Morris notes that migrating to South Africa was also 
relatively easy when many of these groups came in the early1990s when many 
Nigerians and Congolese entered. These groups now experience crime and 
violence, police brutality and harassment, unemployment and financial hardships, 
as well as issues of obtaining proper documentation to maintain their status in 
the country. Morris attributes the attitudes of South Africans towards these 
Congolese and Nigerians to their groups being easily identifiable by their physical 
features and lack of fluency in an indigenous language, the negative stereotypes 
of these groups, and the lack of education and isolation of Black South Africans 
during the Apartheid era. Morris concludes that this is a facet of the scapegoating 
explanation for xenophobic violence. Strikingly, Nigerians and Congolese, while 
there are such negative archetypes for this group, they do not seem to have 
been comprised a great deal of those attacked in the may 2008 attacks.  
     Bronwyn Harris responds to some of Morris’ arguments in her article 
critically. Specifically, Harris assesses three hypotheses proposed for 
xenophobic violence: Scapegoating, Isolation, and Bio cultural. Scapegoating – 
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which Harris identifies as arising from sociological theory – is characterized by 
explaining the hostility towards foreigners as frustrations about limited resources 
(she cites housing, education, healthcare, and employment). Harris finds that 
with this argument there is no clear explanation as to why this frustration leads to 
violence and why this violence is directed particularly at foreigners. Secondly, 
she talks about the Isolation argument, which suggests that South Africans were 
insulated during Apartheid from nationalities outside of Southern Africa. This 
hypothesis, Harris argues, does not explain why nationality is the determining 
feature of the scapegoating. Finally, she considers the Bio Cultural argument, 
which suggests that physical features of foreigners make them an easily 
identifiable ‘Other.’ 16 
 However, Harris argues that this still does not explain why it is particularly 
African foreign nationals that are targeted. White and Asian populations are not 
targeted to the same extent, and they are also an easily identifiable ‘Other’, 
perhaps even more easily identifiable as an ‘Other’. Harris concludes that 
xenophobia is a product of a ‘culture of violence’ that is engendered in the legacy 
of apartheid, meaning: violence is a legitimate means through which to achieve 
certain goals. Therefore, Harris accepts xenophobic violence as a facet of what 
she terms the ‘Post-apartheid project’, a host of policies and objectives that arose 
in post-1994 South African society. The central issue with this explanation is that 
they emphasize the role of political and social structures and actors without 
qualifying way social conditions also potentially function to inform the actions of 
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the attackers. Furthermore, it is unclear what violence in the Apartheid era she is 
referring to.  
 There certainly has been a history of violence in the country during the 
Apartheid era and even preceding it; however, the lack of an investigation into 
this history leaves her argument incomplete. Instead of emphasizing the violent 
past of South Africa, research has gone in the direction of focusing on 
immigrations into South Africa somewhat presuming that if there are less 
immigrants the frustrations over resources will cease. The underlying assumption 
of this sentiment is that the post-Apartheid era has witnessed a flood of 
immigrants into the country, and this somehow related to the democratization of 
the country.  
     Dorrit Posel reveals that there has not been much rural-urban migration as is 
often presumed.17 Posel looks at household surveys in order to determine how much 
movement there is between rural and urban regions in South Africa. Interestingly, 
she finds that what is occurring is one person from a rural household will go into the 
city and work to send back remittances. In fact, she finds that a large proportion of 
remittances are commonly being sent into rural areas, and she even identifies a 
period in which this increased in the 1990s. If as Everatt noted earlier migrants often 
reside in urban areas and there is very little rural-urban migration within South Africa, 
this would suggests that resources and services are geographically more accessible 
for migrants. Perhaps migrants in South Africa can access more of the resources of 
the city than South African citizens living in rural areas. There is also a rise of urban 
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poverty, which in recent years may have become more of a priority than rural 
poverty. 
     Regulating the movement of native Africans during Apartheid was essential 
for the regime’s way to ensure that wealth was distributed in a way that favored 
them. David Everatt writes, 
“The ANC inherited apartheid urban design, which aimed physically to 
separate white suburbs from black (classified variously as African or 
colored or Indian) townships. White areas included a tax base derived 
from nearby industry and services; black areas did not, and 
prohibitions existed regarding the types of business allowed in 
townships. White local authorities administered African townships, but 
residents had to finance their own development. It was a system 
designed to underprovide for blacks, legitimated by the “grand 
apartheid” notion that all blacks were “foreigners” in white areas and 
“citizens” only of their tribal homelands.”18 [Everatt 2000; 224] 
 
 Everatt suggests that one essential way to rectify the Apartheid past in the 
‘new South Africa is through land use planning. He claims that the South African 
government has not implemented policies that provide greater access for the rural 
poor. Therefore, accessibility of services and resources, which are often 
concentrated in urban areas, has not changed much since Apartheid. Moreover, the 
issue of poverty will not wane with more people in the cities, it is apparent that many 
South Africans migrating to cities continue to have issues finding adequate housing 
and employment. In addition, Posel argues that rural dwelling South Africans also 
may perceive migrating to the city as too risky. 
     The African population was relied on as a circular migrant labor force during 
Apartheid and it seems from Everatt and Posel’s assessments that this has not 
changed very much. Africans were restricted to living in rural areas, and African men 
would migrate to the city to work as miners. This is another reason rural populations 
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likely have a bleak outlook for even their status in the country. She attributes this to 
the notion that concerns related to immigrations are a more immediate issue. 
However, the most pressing issue for the post-Apartheid government should be the 
conveyance of opportunities for political and economic participation to those 
marginalized by Apartheid policies and practices, particularly those largely isolated in 
rural areas. However, the micro-level issues of South African citizens have become 
difficult to identify because the social realities of South Africans is clouted by legal 
processes, and this is why the pressing concern is seemingly immigrations. 
However, in the proceeding chapter, I will explore the historical movement of Blacks 
into South Africa. Much of what is discovered is that both native and non-native 
























	   	   	  











 The rationale for xenophobia as directly causal to the violence that has 
occurred in South Africa posits the discourse of violence in a discourse on 
immigrations in South Africa. This is why the literature reviewed in the preceding 
chapter focused primarily on the lives of migrants in their host country. A history 
of Black movement into, even out of, South Africa is requisite for a discussion of 
xenophobic sentiment and violence, because any exploration of anti-foreigner 
sentiment must first consider who the foreigners and their social realities within 
the country they’re entering. Therefore, the second chapter of this inquiry seeks 
to investigate the history of Black migrations into the territory that is presently the 
Republic of South Africa. In the previous two decades there has been tumultuous 
violence within South Africa, and this violence is often presumed to 
disproportionately affect recent immigrants. It has been proposed that this 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  21	  
violence is the result of disturbingly high levels of xenophobic sentiment in South 
Africa.19  
 The proceeding chapter will begin with a brief introduction of the British 
presence in the territory as early as 1820. Following that section there will be a 
brief discussion of indentured Indians in South Africa, and challenges the British 
experience asserting dominance. Then, finally, there will be an exploration into 
the advent of the mining industry and the recruiting of migrant labor. This is of 
particular importance because migration patterns in the post-Apartheid era are 
impacted by labor recruiting organizations. For most Africans, being recruited as 
migrant mine labor was the only legal means through which one could enter 
South Africa until the demise of migrant labor in the late 1970s. This chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the ways in which migration patterns have 
changed and in the post-Apartheid era and begins the discussion of the ways in 
which South Africa’s urban landscape has remained largely unchanged in the 
post-Apartheid era. 
Early British Presence in southern Africa 
 John Stone’s “Colonist or Uitlander” provides an account of the early 
British migrations. Stone cites 1820 as the first mass influx of British into 
southern Africa’s Cape Colony. A man by the name of Benjamin Moodie is 
credited with leading this group to the territory.20 Moodie was a wealthy British 
man, who had lost a fair amount of his family’s wealth due to economic downturn 
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following the Napoleonic Wars in Britain. He gathered 5,000 British proletarians 
to migrate by ship to southern Africa. However, Moodie underestimated how 
developed the agricultural industry was in the Cape Colony and shortly following 
their arrival many of the British accompanying Moodie breached their contracts 
and went to work for Afrikaner farmers because they could earn higher wages. 
This occurrence was the first of several schemes intended for British economic 
expansion into the southern African territory. The challenge of the British in this 
instance was that the agriculture market had been fully established, and that the 
Afrikaner ethnic groups had already dominated it.  
 It was not until the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1860 that the 
British were able to take part in the early stages of the formal mining industry, 
hence economic expansion into southern Africa. First, the British functioned 
solely as merchants that traded the diamonds. Later, they take part in the actual 
mining of diamonds and other valuable resources in the region. Kimberley, also 
referred to as the diamond city, was the site where much of the early mining took 
place. After some time there were four major mining companies in the city. These 
companies included De Beers and the Kimberley Diamond Mine, which were the 
two most profitable. Both whites and Blacks were first there independently 
shoveling and searching for diamonds. However, it was discovered by scientist 
that diamonds were also underground, and the British took this opportunity to 
develop and introduce new mechanism for extracting diamonds.21 British wealth 
that came from the trading of diamonds was insecure, primarily because they had 
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no political authority of the area in which the diamonds existed; therefore, they 
were unable to make a claim to the diamonds that had been discovered. 
Kimberley was claimed by the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (Afrikaner 
republics), the Tswana chiefdom, and the Griqua chiefdom of Nicholas (both 
Black African tribes). In 1871 the British annexed Griqualand West and 
convinced Waterboer, the chief, to allow the Griqua territories to become 
protectorates of the British, which allowed them to claim part of the Kimberley 
territory.22  
 Although the British now had a legitimate claim to the territory; the problem 
that was that they had not establish governmental administration; therefore, 
industrialists and political figures in the territory were able to maintain political 
control, hence the diamonds, which undermined the British attempt at control. 
Later in the 1800s there was the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand and the 
creation of recruiting organizations for outside labor sources. The recruiting of 
outside labor seems to have be a logical solution to the challenges that the 
British faced in the past of having others in the territory make claims to the 
valuable land. Recruiting allowed for restrictions on those working on the mines. 
Laborers were hired on a contract that would last for three to six months and 
there was never the challenge of having to provide citizenship or share the 
profits, they simply paid them wages and returned them back to their home 
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country.23 These workers were usually from surrounding territories, and they 
were largely rural and agrarian. 
 On the cusp of the twentieth century was the Anglo-Boer War (1899-
1902); a result of this event was the expansion of the British Empire with the 
founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910. The end of the Anglo-Boer War 
marked the inception of British reign in South Africa. The Union of South Africa 
was not an independent state; instead, it was a dominion state of the British 
Empire. The Union had to follow British rule and could not implement policies that 
were not aligned with the interests of Great Britain. The African population was 
excluded from the mining industry for British profiteering through the use of 
government. The British had acquired a claim to the territory, but were 
undermined because of the lack of government structure. The Black labor on the 
mines had been recruited from surrounding nations. This was likely due to the 
fact that the government had the most control of the movement of those 
populations through recruitment organizations. The Union of South Africa 
provided much more legitimacy for the British; however, the challenge of 
maintaining both legitimacy and dominance continued to plague them.   
Indians and the British Dilemma 
 An indispensable part of British efforts in the beginning of the 20th century 
was the control of movement of peoples into the territory. This was primarily due 
to the British being the least populous group in the region. Native Africans were 
kept at bay through recruitment organizations and the passage of segregationist 
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policies – i.e. The Native Lands Act and other pass laws, which restricted their 
movement within the union. Indians had been brought into South Africa 
indentured by the British in the Natal province to offset ‘racial complication’24 by 
creating more diversity. Peberdy identified ‘racial complication’ as the central 
challenge of the British, because native African populations in areas surrounding 
Natal had outnumbered the British. Therefore, the British brought indentured 
Indians as an attempt to offset racial homogeneity. Ironically, the British brought 
so many indentured Indians into Natal that the Indians outnumbered them. This 
created another challenge to asserting British dominance in the region. 
Furthermore, their political mobility and educational attainment was threatening to 
the British because they were not as easily exploitable. Exacerbating this was the 
inciting of peaceful dissent from Mohandes Ghandi. 
 The difficult task of the British was creating immigration legislation that 
would exclude as many Indian people from entering South Africa as they could.25 
In addition, the British were trying to create incentives for immigrations from 
Britain to the union, and the way they had decided to conduct this was through 
the development and reconstruction of the territory. Sally Peberdy, in Selecting 
Immigrants, notes that part of the objective for industrialization was to incentivize 
immigrations into South Africa for British. 26  In “Selecting Immigrants”, Sally 
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Peberdy cites Lord Milner (the leader of the colonial government of the 
Transvaal) stating,  
“Obviously the best, and only means of encompassing this end, as 
well as promoting the influx of British population, which is the only 
safeguard of our position, is to go ahead as hard as possible, 
drums beating and colours flying, with the development of the 
country and its resources.”27	  	  
	  
It is self-evident that the British aspiration was to garner a large enough 
population to solidify dominance in the region. Although, the more Indians 
entering, the greater the amount of British they had to try and recruit into the 
territory in order to avoid ‘racial complication’. The recruiting of Europeans had 
been largely unsuccessful. Moreover, the arrival of Mohandes Gandhi in South 
Africa further aggravated this existing threat. Gandhi was educated in London 
and later went to South Africa where he led some of the first passive resistance 
movement, warranting the concerns of the British. On 16 August of 1908, Gandhi 
gathered Muslims, Hindus, and Christians in a symbolic pass28 burning in front of 
the Hamidia mosque in Newtown (near present-day Johannesburg).29 This event 
was emblematic for the use of passive resistance as a form of peaceful dissent. 
Gandhi was imprisoned for this; however, it clearly left many of the British 
authorities weary of opposition. 
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 Mohandas Gandhi’s development of passive resistance and other 
campaigns incited urgency for the creation of immigration policies that excluded 
Indians.30 Preceding the pass burning, the objective of bringing more Indians into 
South Africa was for the purpose of creating more diversity in the region because 
native Africans largely outnumbered them and they believed that more Indians 
would curb the likelihood that the Africans would revolt. In effect, the British were 
attempting to manage social relations through the movement of people in order to 
maintain dominance and amass wealth from the industrialization of South Africa. 
In June of 1913, the Union of South Africa passed the first Immigration 
Regulation Act of the new government.  Gandhi returned to India in 1914 
following the passage of the first immigration legislation of the Union of South 
Africa. The objective of the act was explicitly to limit the movement of Indians 
within South Africa, and prevent some Indians from immigrating to South Africa.31 
Despite the passing of this egregious immigration policy, Gandhi felt that his work 
in South Africa had been complete because he left the passive resistance 
ideology. Passive resistance was also the ideology taken on by the African 
National Congress (ANC) in the beginning of their anti-Apartheid efforts.  
 Blacks were perceived as insignificant because their movement was 
regulated by recruitment organization that had existed since the beginning of the 
mining industry and even before. Indigenous Blacks were occupied with conflicts 
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between the chiefdoms and protecting themselves from colonist. Industrialization 
is cited as complicating the divisions between the chiefdoms. Mission-clergy, 
successful peasants, and teachers challenged the legitimacy of the chiefs 
resulting in new challenges for existing hierarchies of the chiefdoms.32 Fissures 
amongst African chiefdoms went unnoticed by the British; but they were seminal 
for the British to maintain dominance. Gandhi’s departure from South Africa and 
the control of movement of persons within, into, and out of the territory provided 
the British with the power to keep up primacy in the region. Finally, it is evident 
that increased population control is vital to the maintenance of British dominance. 
Africans as a Non-Threat to British Rule  
“For the state, Indians, with all their ‘civilisation’, education, and 
business success could never enter the imaginary of the white 
nation of South Africa. Black Africans were never considered as 
potential immigrants and so did not appear in immigration 
debates.”33  
 
 In the above-cited passage Sally Peberdy establishes that Indians were a 
central threat to the British. However, most striking about the rest of the passage 
is that Peberdy finds no indication that Africans are considered a potential 
immigrant group. This is because by 1913 the primary mechanism monitoring 
Black movement into, even out of, South Africa was the operations of recruitment 
organizations. The Witwatersrand National Labor Association – or, as some refer 
to it “Wenela” — became the most prominent of these organizations. Additionally, 
there was the control of the movement of Africans within the territory through 
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several domestic policies that limited the movement of Black Africans within 
South Africa. Some of the most famous of these policies are the Native Lands 
Act of 1911, which prohibits Africans from purchasing land and virtually destroys 
subsistence farming. There were also pass laws that prevented Africans, Indians, 
and Coloured people from settling in particular areas.  
 Mining in South Africa began in the 1860s when diamonds were discovered 
in the city of Kimberley – referred to by some as the diamond city. Originally, the 
British functioned as merchants that would trade the diamonds found virtually by 
any and everyone who was willing to move to Kimberley and sift through the 
fields to try and find diamonds. However, it was later discovered by scientists that 
diamonds were also deep underground as well as on the surface, inducing the 
interest in underground mining and the beginning of what becomes the 
predominate industry in South Africa.34After some time there were four major 
mining companies in the city. These companies included De Beers and the 
Kimberley Diamond Mine, which were the two most profitable. Both whites and 
Blacks were first there independently shoveling and searching for diamonds.  
 However, British wealth that could come from the trading of diamonds was 
insecure, primarily because they had no control of the area in which the 
diamonds existed, hence they were unable to make a claim to the diamonds that 
were being found. Kimberley was claimed by the Transvaal and the Orange Free 
State (Afrikaner republics), the Tswana chiefdom, and the Griqua chiefdom of 
Nicholas (both Black African tribes). In 1871 the British annexed Griqualand West 
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and convinced Waterboer, the chief, to allow them to provide British protections 
to Griqua territories, which allowed them to claim part of the Kimberley territory. 
Although they British now had a legitimate presence in the territory; the problem 
that remained for the British was that they did not establish governmental 
administration; therefore, industrialists and political figures in the territory were 
able to maintain political control, hence the diamonds, which undermined the 
British attempt at control. 
 Wenela was created at the end of the nineteenth century by the Chamber of 
Mines for the purpose of limiting competition between mining companies in the 
territory for outside labor sources. The creation of Wenela was prompted by the 
discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand. Preceding to the discovery of gold on the 
Witwatersrand the largest recruiting organization was the Rand National Labour 
Association, which was later restructured and renamed Wenela. The proliferation 
of the mining industry required a steady and stable stream of labor. R. Mansell 
Prothero, in “Foreign Migrant Labour for South Africa,” writes: 
“The temporary status of migrants in a foreign country and the 
control exercised over them in their work and at other times has 
produced a labour force which can do little to organize itself.”35  
 
Prothero argues that an inconsistent migrant labor force was more advantageous 
than a consistent labor force that was native because their presence was by law 
impermanent. Impermanence and inconsistency was especially important for 
African migrant laborers who were native to the Union of South Africa. This is 
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evidenced simply in the difference of term limits for laborers. Native laborers 
were only given ten and a half month term limits, while non-native laborers were 
allotted one to two year terms at a time.36  
 Perberdy makes the claim that Indians were the only legitimate threat to 
British dominance through an analysis of the immigration policy throughout 
Africa’s history. However, this claim is based solely on immigration policies, and 
the absence of an assessment of domestic policies to regulate African natives 
and recruiting of African labor migrants does not provide the fullest understanding 
of the reality. Peberdy does not explore in great depth the mining industry and 
the ways in which recruiting migrant labor functioned as a way to monitor the 
movement of Africans. This argument is a clear example of the way that deeming 
the cause of the violence in post-Apartheid South Africa xenophobic sentiment 
limits the discourse to merely an assessment of the movements of peoples, in 
some cases across borders that do not reflect the social realities of the people 
living in the territory. 
The Era of Recruiting 
 In the years preceding the creation of the Rand National Labor 
Association, individual mining companies were established in order to recruit 
labor for work on the diamond mines in Kimberley. At this juncture the agricultural 
industry in the region was the most developed and established, presenting a 
challenge for recruiting a great deal of workers to the mines. The tribal-ethnic 
groups most present on the mines in the 1870s were the Pedis, Tsongas, and 
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the south Sotho. These ethnic-tribal groups all originated from the Sotho or 
Basuto ancestry, and there presence in this territory dates back to the fifth 
century. The incentive for these ethnic-tribal groups to work on the mines was 
varied. The Pedi ethnic-tribal group had chosen to work on the mines as a way to 
earn a means to purchase weapons to defend themselves against aggression 
from other tribes and colonist. Additionally, although to a lesser extent, these 
groups also used the money earned from mining for bride-wealth. After some 
time, it becomes apparent that competition between mining companies over labor 
can be detrimental to the viability of the industry because it had resulted in 
increased wages. This prompted the creation of the Rand Native Labour 
Association to centralize migrant labor recruiting in order to limit competition 
amongst the mines.  
 In the late 1800s, the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand incited 
greater demand for labor. Due to an agreement with Portugal, the British began 
to recruit very heavily from Portuguese East Africa (present day Mozambique). 
The agreement allowed the Chamber of Mines in South Africa to enter 
Portuguese East Africa and recruit migrant laborers. Marie Wentzel notes that in 
the period between 1890 and 1899, the population of migrant laborers from 
Portuguese East Africa increased from fourteen thousand to ninety-seven 
thousand.37 The increasing productivity of the mining industry is undeniable from 
these figures. In 1900, the Rand Native Labour Association was restructured and 
renamed the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (“Wenela”). This new 
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organization expands its recruiting efforts through agreements made with colonial 
authorities in other African countries. Additionally, the Witwatersrand Native 
Labour Association operated a transportation system throughout southern Africa. 
This system the primary means through which labor migrants would move into 
and out of South Africa. This system had included buses, trains, and eventually 
air travel. Migrant laborers were transported in at the beginning of their contracts, 
and would immediately be repatriated after their contracts were up. Migrants 
were typically male and they were often entering from rural areas around 
southern Africa. 
 The territories from which Wenela recruited had agreements with the 
Chamber of Mines, which allowed them to recruit laborers from these particular 
countries. Contracts were important because they allowed British authorities in 
South Africa to manage the movement of the labor migrants within South Africa. 
Additionally, these populations were never allowed to have citizenship or any 
other legal status; however, many of the recruits spent a significant proportion of 
their lives in South Africa. Working conditions on the mines are notorious for 
being dangerous and mineworkers were frequently injured. Additionally, the 
mines have been the sites of ethnic-based violence. The mine owners 
strategically house miners in compounds according to their ethnic affiliations. 
They are also allocated tasks based on their ethnic affiliations.38 This functioned 
to prevent the development of camaraderie between the migrants, and the result 
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was often fighting amongst different ethnic groups on the mines.  
The Post-Recruiting Era 
 In 1904, Wenela made arrangements with the colonial authorities in 
Njassaland (present-day Malawi) for the recruiting of workers on the gold mines. 
Five thousand went to work on the mines that year. However, in 1913, the Union 
of South Africa prohibited the recruitment of labor from any territory that is north 
of 22 degrees south latitude, because laborers from that territory had a high 
mortality (often developing pneumonia and lung disease). The ban was lifted in 
1937, and the deal between Wenela and Malawi was formalized in 1938.  
Following a 1974 plane crash, in which a Wenela plane was transporting 
Malawian laborers to South Africa and 72 Malawians were killed, the Malawi 
government stopped external recruiting. Then, again recruiting was allowed in 
1977, but in 1988 it was stopped because of a dispute over HIV testing.  
 In 1973 South Africa signed bilateral agreements with Botswana and 
Lesotho to recruit labor migrants. A similar bilateral agreement was signed with 
Swaziland in 1975. Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) initially 
prohibited blacks from working outside of the country. In 1974, they made a deal 
with Wenela that allowed the active recruitment of its citizens; however, this was 
prohibited in 1980 due to Zimbabwean independence.  
 The presence of Malawians, Zambians, Tanzanians, and Angolans was 
never substantial on the mines in the union. It is most probable that there were 
greater costs associated with transporting these populations into South Africa, 
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and the challenge of them getting sick and dying on the mines makes recruiting 
from the places listed above less desirable. The Portuguese benefitted greatly 
from the recruiting that the Union of South Africa did in Portuguese East Africa. 
The laborers working on the mines in South Africa contributed immensely to the 
economy there through remittances. As time goes on the proportion of native to 
non-native laborers shifts, and eventually natives are the majority on the mines.   
 Mozambique and Lesotho sustained the largest populations on the mines 
as the shift from predominately foreign laborers to native laborers. Mozambican 
laborers on the mines declined dramatically after 1975.39 Lesotho maintains a 
high proportion of miners on the mines up until 1995. The mining industry 
transformed in the 1970s because workers were now able to have unionize, there 
were more health and safety regulations, the compound system had changed. 
The implementation of these changes turned the migrants into more of a 
proletarian group, insomuch as they now had the opportunity to make demands. 
Additionally, there was an amnesty offered to mineworkers in 1995, which would 
have allowed them to receive permanent residence in South Africa and bring 
their families. However, only slightly under half of the mineworkers eligible 
applied. Many of them chose not to apply because of attachments at home and 
many of them do not desire to be South African citizens. Those who did apply did 
so for the tax benefits and in order to be able to seek employment in another 
industry. The largest proportion of those who applied had been from Lesotho.40 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Crush, 15 
40 Crush, 16 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  36	  
Although Malawian labor contracts had ceased there 350 of them applied for the 
amnesty that was offered in 1995. 
 Following the decline of contract labor Marie Wentzel notes that the impact 
was that employers of temporary workers had illegal foreign labor supplies to 
extract a cheap labor force from, and this did not require cross-border recruiting. 
In addition, the illegal status of these groups leaves them more exploitable and 
provides a loophole to the rise of labor unions and labor regulation in the 
Apartheid era. Illegal workers in South Africa worked primarily in the following 
four sectors: agriculture, the construction industry, transportation services, and 
tourism. One migrant interviewed by Wentzel states: 
“My father worked on a South African mine for many years. 
Although he only visited us once a year, he regularly sent us money 
for schooling, clothes and food. I grew up with the idea that I would 
also work on a South African mine when I became old enough. 
Unfortunately there were no vacancies at the mine, but I 
nevertheless decided to come to South Africa to look for a job. 
Because my brother and two of my friends found jobs in the 
construction business, I thought that I would also be able to find a 
job there.”41  
 
The above statement gives insight into the way in which “Wenela,” through a 
presence in communities outside of the Union established labor migration as a 
norm. The involvement of outside labor in South Africa was not limited to simply 
working in the country; instead, it is apparent from the above statement that 
working on the mines in South Africa had become an expectation. The above-
account is also an example of existing networks in South Africa for those 
expecting to work in South Africa. “Wenela” did everything it could to manage 
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those entering and leaving the country by having bus depots and other means of 
transportation into the country. Eventually “Wenela” had even been coordinating 
a fleet of airplanes to bring migrants into South Africa. However, this was clearly 
not enough to prevent some from remaining in the country illegally. Employers 
benefitted from the ignorance of these migrants. Wentzel interviewed one labor 
migrant who was caught illegally in the country, and he stated: 
“I think I was arrested because my Mozambican passport has 
expired. I do not need a worker’s permit since I have a Mozambican 
passport. My employer did not ask any documentation. In fact, 
before this arrest nobody in this country ever asked any 
documentation from me.”42  
 
The above comment is evidence of how entrenched foreign migrant labor in 
South Africa had become a social norm. Therefore, the tradition of a migrant 
labor system and the end of labor recruiting organizations certainly had 
significant impacts on illegal migrants entering South Africa seeking employment. 
 Although the perception of South Africa for most migrants (76%) was that it 
offered better employment opportunities; Wentzel finds that many entering 
migrants leave South Africa because they find that there are not many 
employment opportunities. She finds in the survey that the three primary reasons 
migrants would leave the country are: ‘no suitable employment’ at 67%, ‘no 
suitable income’ at 49%, and ‘poverty and not enough food to eat’ also at 49%. 
Therefore, this suggests that many enter South Africa and continue to face many 
challenges at finding employment. It seems that the only migrant group that has 
any chance of successfully obtaining employment in South Africa are illegal 
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migrants because they are more exploitable and willing to work for lower wages.  
Conclusion 
 Wentzel writes, “It is commonly assumed that South Africa’s 
democratization has encouraged increased migration to the country from the 
region, both legally and illegally.”43 As discussed in the first chapter, it is clearly a 
misconception that the increase in immigrations to South Africa are the result of 
democratization of the country, primarily because of the assessment in the 
preceding chapter conducted by South African sociologist. It is evident from 
turnout rate of those who applied for the amnesty offered in 1995 that being a 
permanent resident of South Africa is not as desirable as the above-assumption 
proposes. Furthermore, the finding that anti-foreigner sentiment is unreasonably 
high would make the country even more undesirable. Again, the claim that 
Africans are coming into the country because of South African democratization 
and for citizenship remains unfounded. Migrations have historically been 
motivated by economic factors, and they continue to be motivated by economic 
factors. There is, however, a population of refugees and asylum seekers in South 
Africa, but these populations often have challenges finding employment and the 
motivations behind their claims for refugee status are related to persecutions in 
their country of origin. The refugee population as well as the legal migrant 
population face challenges at obtaining employment partially because of their 
lack of legal protections.  
 Dorrit Posel finds, in Have Migration Patterns Changed, from an analysis of 
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household surveys that many of the rural-urban migration patterns within South 
Africa have not changed substantially since the end of Apartheid.44 Although 
legislation preventing Africans from settling in urban areas has been repealed, 
many Africans have remained in the rural homelands. Posel tracks this by looking 
at the income breakdown of rural households, and the findings suggest that many 
of the rural households’ income are comprised of remittances sent from the urban 
areas. This suggests that the physical challenges to economic mobility and 
wealth have not been rectified simply by a policy change. David Everatt proposes 
that an evaluation of the urbanization of South Africa is essential to finding a 
solution to the lack of access to important resources.45 Posel suggests that policy 
changes in the post-Apartheid era have led many policymakers and researchers 
to emphasize immigrations to an extent that there is no longer any coverage in 
the national survey of internal labor migrations.  
 She attributes this to the increase in migrations to South Africa, but 
particularly the assumption that entering migrants are interested in staying in 
South Africa. Moreover, I propose that the predominating of immigrations, as a 
policy concern does not simply affect the data collected in national surveys, but 
has limited the scope through which the violence of May 2008 has been 
assessed. Anti-foreigner sentiment is assumed to be the primary issue because 
the country’s dominating issue is immigration, which from previously mentioned 
studies is unfounded. However, as long as these assumptions exist and are 
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disseminated through media and political figures such as Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s 
comments publicly proclaiming immigrants as South Africa’s major problem,46 
other factors motivating the violence remain unnoticed. I propose that the next 
step in an investigation of the violence of 2008 is to take apply a historical 
approach to understanding violence in South Africa. 
 The first chapter of this inquiry established that xenophobic sentiment was 
high in South Africa, and that an underlying cause of this was the consensus 
among South Africans that immigrants are taking jobs and putting strain on the 
countries resources. The objective of this chapter was to assess African 
migrations into South Africa, because establishing a general history of the 
migrations should suggest some sort of tension between native African laborers 
and non-native laborers. However, what one finds is that native laborers and non-
native African laborers both had a presence on the mines and as Apartheid nears 
an end, the more native laborers there were on the mines. Therefore, one might 
expect that as the majority of workers recruited to be mine workers shifts towards 
more native African mineworkers, there is less hostility. However, this has not 
been the case. Instead, as I will explore in the next chapter, when evaluating the 
violence that occurs on the mines it is apparent that this violence is strategic and 
in some instances had not ended in deaths.  
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 In the first chapter of this inquiry, one of the explanations provided for 
xenophobic violence was the theory that it is the product of a ‘culture of 
violence’47 within South Africa that came about stemming from the Apartheid era. 
However, Bronwyn Harris did not take this discussion any further. It was left 
merely as a suggestion. One thing that remains clear is that violence has been a 
facet of South African life for centuries, and it persists. Speculation of whether or 
not violence is motivated by xenophobic sentiment or simply crime or some sort 
of tribal conflict; the history, social realities, and political assumptions of the 
society must first be considered. Historically, this inquiry has established that the 
movement of Africans – both native and non-native – has been controlled and 
restricted through recruiting organizations for purposes of British interests in 
southern Africa. This has impacted social realities for the post-Apartheid era, 
inasmuch as recruiting has allowed labor migration to become a norm. In 
addition, the ANC negotiated Black political dominance, initiating a regime shift, 
resulting in new political assumptions that perpetuate South African superiority. 
However, when considering social realities there is another story. 
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 Since the end of Apartheid, rural African natives of South Africa have 
continued to function largely as a migrant labor force.48 Those residing in urban 
areas continue to reside largely in informal settlements and remain cut off from 
accessing the services and resources of the urban areas and often face evictions 
from informal settlements. Unemployment continues to be a major issue that is 
not only frustrating urban dwellers, but also discouraging rural dwellers from 
seeking to migrate into the city. This leaves those most likely to need assistance 
cut off from important resources such as education, healthcare, adequate 
housing, and in some instances clean water. In addition, the newly inaugurated 
constitution of South Africa assures resources to the people of South Africa that it 
often fails to supply. In the midst of such deprivation, immigrations of Africans 
from other African nations are also a social reality that persists in the post-
recruiting era. Many of these immigrants work informally, and some of them even 
enter clandestinely and work illegally for lower wages than South Africans are 
willing to.  
 These circumstances have provided for what many have deemed 
xenophobic violence incited by deprivation. However, from the preceding 
assessment of the history of movement of Africans into South Africa, there is no 
evidence to support the claim that there is direct causation between xenophobic 
sentiment and the violence that has been occurring in South Africa. In fact, 
distinctions between native and non-native mineworkers never seem to be 
emphasized. Instead, the tribal-ethnic affiliations of the mineworkers are what 
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tend to be emphasized as a strategy for maintaining conflict between lower level 
workers in order to thwart labor opposition. 
 This chapter begins with a brief review of life and violence on the mines in 
South Africa, which is primarily comprised of ‘faction fights’. Following this I 
provide an assessment of the types of violent occurrences that have been 
prescribed as xenophobic with a content analysis of some reports of xenophobic 
violence in contemporary South Africa. In my assessment of these events I find 
that although the conflicts are often between native South Africans and 
foreigners, often the cause is varied; simple dislike or hatred because one is a 
foreigner is rarely paramount.  Finally, I contend that the politicization of 
xenophobia in South Africa has resulted in the predominance of xenophobia as 
the motive for violence in South Africa. 
‘Faction Fights’ on South African Gold Mines 
 Chapter two established a history of labor migrants who enter the Union of 
South Africa primarily as mineworkers. This section will focus on the ways in 
which work roles were allocated on the mines. Mineworkers were recruited both 
outside of the union and within the Union’s remote rural territories. The structure 
of social life on South African mines was organized in such a way that ethnic-
tribal affiliations were intensified. Work roles and housing assignments in 
compounds were allocated according to tribal-ethnic affiliations. Therefore, it 
seems evident that managers of the mines encouraged some sense of 
camaraderie amongst different groups. This seems peculiar when considering 
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that the British were such a small segment of the overall population, and that 
camaraderie would likely lead to a greater risk of labor opposition. However, the 
British mine managers benefitted from the existing divisions between the different 
ethnic groups. Determining which tasks to allocate to specific ethnic-tribal groups 
was based on stereotypes of these groups. For example, men on the mines from 
the Mpondo ethnic-tribal group were hired as drillers (machine boys) because of 
their reputation for having physical strength.49 The way in which the Mpondo 
would maintain their status as drillers – which was desirable because it was 
considered well paid – was by provoking fights with men from other ethnic-tribal 
groups. 
 This system of organizing labor results in ‘faction fights’ becoming a norm, 
inasmuch as the only way in which mineworkers have agency to. Although the 
types of work they were assigned was according to ethnic-tribal affiliations, the 
work groups were mixed which meant that the men had to interact with one 
another. In order to maintain their status as dominant and be assigned work that 
was more desirable because of slightly higher pay, men from the different groups 
would fight to assert their dominance amongst the other ethnic groups. Generally, 
the Basuto ethnic group, which was native to South Africa, would be the largest 
population on the mines when they were first opened; however, as time went on 
their would be more men with other ethnic-tribal affiliations entering. The Basutos 
would, in order to assert their dominance, pin-prick men from other ethnic groups 
if that group had begun to predominate in terms of population. This sort of 
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violence was commonplace on the mines, and because of this stereotypes of the 
different groups would develop. Therefore, Basutos were considered overbearing 
and arrogant because of these acts.   
 Accounts of this sort of violence are fragmented because mine managers 
suppressed knowledge of this behavior, primarily because this could potentially 
disrupt recruiting efforts. T. Dunbar Moodie finds in his archival work that the 
most complete record of mine violence is from 1913 at Crown Mines. This 
occurrence was prominent primarily because over one thousand workers were 
killed due to mine violence, and the NRC threatened to halt recruiting for Crown 
Mines. There was intragroup violence among the African miners, as well as 
violent conflicts between white and Black miners. The abuse of African workers 
at the hands of white miners was common according to a white union 
representative because it was a way of asserting dominance over them. 
 The African mineworkers were allocated tasks in which they would assist 
white skilled miners. This work included drilling, digging holes shoveling, and 
shaft sinking. There were also some positions assisting the white supervisors 
with keeping the rest of the African laborers in check. This was a particularly 
desirable position because the wages were slightly higher. The ethnic-tribal 
group that was chosen to do that type of work was called the ‘boss boys’. It was 
not singularly ethnic-tribal affiliations that provided the conditions for conflict. 
Instead, the way that work assignments were allocated and the way that different 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  46	  
positions impacted the livelihood of the workers. There were also differences in 
pay that had an immensely important effect on desirable jobs.  
 This is important for understanding the way in which ethnic-tribal 
affiliations were used in conjunction with the manipulation of the allocation of 
resources as a way in which to provoke conflict between different groups. In 
contemporary South Africa, xenophobic sentiment is explained primarily as an 
issue invoked by disparity in the allocation of resources and the lack of jobs. 
However, the focus of assuaging these problems relies on the removal or 
limitation of immigrations into South Africa; instead of emphasizing better 
methods of service delivery and working to ensure political and economic 
participation of all South Africans. Ultimately, this violence is not organically 
arising simply because of hatred for foreigners, and there certainly is no natural 
inclination that leads one to perceive foreigners as a credible threat. The violence 
that occurred on the mines was not simply about finite resources; instead, it was 
provoked by the system through which work assignments were allocated. The 
contemporary violence witnessed against foreigners is also provoked by the way 
media portrays foreigners and the messages provided from authoritative political 
figures. The violence that occurred on South African mines amongst African 
miners was neither about legal status nor building a national identity; instead, it 
was strategic violence that was used as a method for competing for jobs. 
 The task of determining whether or not there was an egregious intent in 
the allocation of work roles is challenging because there is no evidence to 
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support this claim. However, it seems to obviously be practical, the intentions of 
mine managers in allocating job tasks do not seem to be as clear. Tasks were 
divided up according to stereotypes of the different tribal-ethnic groups. This 
could suggest that that mine managers had malicious intent but, again, there is 
no evidence to support this claim. Regardless of the intent of the mine managers, 
violence pervaded the mine compounds. The different tribal-ethnic groups were 
provided job assignments based primarily on their reputation on the mines. In an 
interview Moodie conducted of a former mineworker, the respondent states: 
“The Mpondo have a reputation for being trouble-makers but in fact 
that is because of their pride. They do fight often so as to not be 
looked down upon. On the job they value their independence – they 
don’t want to be followed about and told what to do. Even the mine 
captain doesn’t push them around if he wants to avoid trouble.”50 
 
It is evident from the above-statement that this particular tribal-ethnic group used 
collective violence strategically to benefit them. The Mpondo, on this particular 
mine, used their reputation as “trouble-makers” to attain jobs as drillers, in which 
they were paid slightly higher wages relative to the other African workers. This is 
an example of the way in which violence was used strategically to attain some 
sort of advantage over the rest of the African mineworkers.  
 According to Marie Wentzel, there were no legal distinctions between 
native and non-native African labor migrants until 1963; however, distinctions 
between the groups were implicit. Moodie finds in his account that the Basutos (a 
native tribal-ethnic group) originally had a greater presence on the mines in the 
early 1940s, but as the proportion of non-native mineworkers increased, Basutos 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 ibid, 588 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  48	  
used collective violence as a way in which to assert some sort of dominance on 
the mines. They ultimately became known as “pin-prickers”, primarily because of 
their choice of method of violence. Basutos would use sharp objects to prick into 
the skin of men who belonged to other tribal-ethnic affiliations.51 This violence 
was not intended to murder the men of opposing tribal-ethnic affiliations; instead, 
it was meant to be symbolic of their dominance. Perhaps this violence is an 
instance of Bronwyn Harris’ ‘culture of violence’ thesis.  
 This sort of mine violence persisted until the 1970s when mine recruiting 
diminished significantly. The prevalence of violence as a way in which to assert 
some sort of dominance certainly continued. Conflicts between the Inkatha 
Freedom Party and the African National Congress certainly were very violent. 
ANC members would carryout violence against members of the opposing Inkatha 
Freedom Party. Ultimately, this violence settled; however, it was often gruesome. 
The tensions between the two political parties certainly were violent; however, it 
seems that this is rarely considered in relation to violence in South Africa.  
Xenophobic Violence in the post-Apartheid Era 
 The outbreak of violence in May 2008 has been the most widely cited 
example of xenophobic violence in South Africa. This occurrence began in the 
township of Alexandria, and the violence that took place in this particular 
township ended with two dead and forty injured. The violence primarily affected 
migrants from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. This occurrence in 
Alexandria and the spreading of the violence can be considered the formative 
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event that prompts the discourse surrounding xenophobic violence in South 
Africa, and in turn begins the emphasis on immigrations. However, preceding this 
occurrence there were several events in which there was the claim that the 
events were the result of direct causality between anti-foreigner sentiment and 
violent occurrences. 
 Perpetrators in the riots of May 2008 determined whom they would attack 
based on whether or not they could perceive them as traditionally South African. 
However, perceptions of what is traditionally South African are subjective. 
Perpetrators targeted those who could not speak a native South African language 
and people who had particular physical features. However, the legal status of 
those attacked was not the essential concern; instead, perpetrators attacked 
those that did not align with their conceptions of what is South African and what 
is not. Perpetrators identified foreigners based primarily on the languages they 
spoke and other physical features. This is evidenced simply from the reality that 
of the sixty-seven people killed, twenty-one of them were South African citizens.52 
This suggests that the claim of xenophobic sentiment as causality for violence 
must be reconsidered. 
 Simply conducting a textual analysis of the media reporting of violence in 
which foreigners are attacked or hurt will provide insight into the ways in which 
the media has emphasized the ‘outsider’ status of those attacked in reports, and 
in most cases the investigating officials are often convinced that the motive is 
xenophobic sentiment even before any investigation is conducted. In one report 
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of seven foreigners who were murdered in one month, the reporter titles the 
article “Xenophobic attacks: seven die in one month” implying a cause for the 
death of the seven people killed. However, the author notes that synchronously 
with the death of the seven foreigners he is reporting on, there was an increase 
in murders generally.53 Therefore, it is evident that the violence is hastily being 
cast as motivated by xenophobic sentiment. The reporter concludes from 
speaking with the residents that they were afraid of refugees and asylum seekers 
will take over property and open businesses in their community.  
  However, in the instance that refugees and asylum seekers are a 
perceived threat, the legal status of this group – which is ultimately what would 
make them foreigners – is not the reason they are targeted. The above-instance 
is an example of how simplistic xenophobia is as a descriptive term for violence. 
In fact, not only is it descriptively insufficient, but it also impedes a rigorous 
investigation of what is actually occurring. The case had not even been fully 
investigated; officials were searching for witnesses and suspects. Therefore, it is 
apparent just how pervasive the idea that xenophobic sentiment is. The officials 
are quoted in the article saying they need to find witnesses and suspects, while 
simultaneously claiming that the violence is a part of a larger trend of xenophobic 
violence. This displays just how dissociated these two ideas are.  
 Strikingly, this is a general format for reporting on violence in which 
foreigners are implicated. It is impossible for perpetrators of violence against 
foreigners to have any motive other than simply that they hate foreigners. This 
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suggests, at least to me, the pervasiveness of political assumptions in the post-
Apartheid era. Even violent acts are interpreted through a lens of political 
abstraction that prevents investigators and policymakers from understanding 
violence against foreigners as more than an issue of legal status. 
 Another interesting facet of this violence is that it seems to often be about 
maintaining ownership of a territory. In another instance of a report of xenophobic 
violence, groups of native Black South Africans living in a squatter camp evict 
Zimbabweans from part of the squatter camp. The South Africans gave the 
Zimbabweans a 10-day ultimatum, and when they failed to comply they were 
forced out and their homes and belongings were burned. The article is included 
as an account of xenophobic violence; however, a more viable solution may 
perhaps arise out of the earlier-mentioned account of David Everatt. Everatt 
claimed that transformation of South African society through urban processes 
must occur. Furthermore, the residents and witnesses of this event themselves 
provide explanations for why they perceive that this event occurred, which is that 
a Zimbabwean had shot and killed a South African offsetting violence.54  
 This instance above alludes slightly to the discussion Everatt was 
attempting to incite about the relationship between urbanization and class 
formation in South Africa. It seems that it is often disregarded that Apartheid was 
in actuality a set of very restrictive land use regulations. The Native Lands Act is 
cited as a formative law for Apartheid legislation. The way in which the Apartheid 
regime restricted the movement of particular groups was through the controlling 
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of land. This is why when Dorrit Posel finds that a large proportion of Black South 
Africans continue to live as labor migrants; progress of the post-Apartheid regime 
is scrutinized. The eviction of Zimbabweans from a South African squatter camp 
does not suggest that they just hate this group and choose not to live with them; 
instead, this suggests that they are protecting the territory in which they live. 
They did not murder any Zimbabweans and they did not immediately approach 
the situation in such a way that was violent and illogical, which is they way 
xenophobic violence is characteristically anticipated to occur. Furthemore, South 
Africa behaves in this way and it is not deemed xenophobic. There have been 
instances in which the South African government decided that they would evict 
South Africans from living in an informal settlement.  
 Moreover, Africans directly implicated in violence have made the claim 
that the violence is not about nationality. In another news report, a group of 
Somali traders seek protection and help from the South African Human Rights 
Commission because of attacks that have been perpetrated against them. In this 
report the regional head of the South African Human Right Commission is quoted 
stating, “They (referring to the Somalis) are not convinced it is xenophobic 
attacks.”55 The cursory statement from the regional director suggests that the 
initial step in an investigation of violence against foreigners is to establish the 
acts as motivated by xenophobia. The issue with this approach is that in the 
event that foreigners attacked do not claim that the violence was not motivated 
by xenophobia there is no objection to framing the violence as such. Therefore, in 
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the circumstances of the May 2008 attacks, in which due to panic there were too 
many foreigners affected to obtain individual accounts, there is no plausible 
objection to that claim.  
 The lack of any objection or any account of the victims who were attacked 
in the May 2008 violence leaves the occurrence completely to the interpretation 
of the government and media. The dominance of xenophobia as the overarching 
social problem of post-Apartheid South Africa has in the preceding examples 
impeded comprehensive investigation of what the causes of violence are, and the 
result of this has been the narrowing of the scope of explanations. The emphasis 
of xenophobia as phenomena has, as I stated earlier, shifted the focus of 
research to contemporary immigrations. The study of immigrations and work on 
the ‘rights’ of migrants procures such significance in national discourse that 
critical domestic issues are overridden by the assumption the most pertinent 
issues are those related to immigrants. This perpetuates the victimization of 
immigrants in South Africa, reifying the assumption that immigrants are 
exhausting South African resources.   
The Politicization of Xenophobia in South Africa 
 The emphasis on xenophobic sentiment shifts the focus of South Africa’s 
problems in a dangerous way, insomuch as the focus becomes regulating who is 
entering the country as a means for developing a national identity. This is 
problematic particularly because alleviating the problems of South African natives 
becomes unnoticed. Furthermore, immigrants as the issue are an unsolvable 
problem. However, the search for viable solutions is impeded because of the 
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politicization of xenophobia in South Africa. One example of how pervasive 
xenophobic violence continues to be even presently is a recent comment from 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in which he states:  
“Xenophobic attack has shamed us all. Other African countries 
contributed their resources, time and energy for our liberation from 
racial rule and its discriminative tendency. And once we became 
free, we resorted to attacking them. This shows that we do not 
appreciate their sacrifice. The entire scenario disgraces us.”56 
 
King Buthelezi, as he is referred to presently, because he is the reigning king of 
the Inkatha Freedom Party (which in many ways is the Zulu political party), 
provides this narrative of other Africans helping in the liberation of South Africa 
and the help as invaluable to the anti-Apartheid struggle. However, this is quite a 
shift from his stance just a few years prior. As the Minister of Home Affairs he 
exclaimed that the influx of immigrants was straining the resources of the South 
African economy and claimed that this was the reason the Reconstruction and 
Development Act had been unsuccessful at providing basic resources to many 
South Africans. 
 Buthelezi and other politicians have repeatedly proclaimed the narrative 
above, in which South Africans must unite with their fellow Africans because of 
some great sacrifice they made in the anti-Apartheid struggle. However, it seems 
apparent that the role of other African countries in the anti-Apartheid struggle was 
primarily in the form of allowing political exiles seeking refuge there. Therefore, 
the sacrifice Buthelezi is suggesting native South Africans do not appreciate is 
something that many of them did not directly benefit from; however, it is a 
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sacrifice that he and many members of the ANC benefitted from. Ultimately, 
xenophobic violence has become the latest, trendy political issue to take on. As I 
stated earlier this posits the discussion of South Africa’s central issues in 
immigrations because their plight is the most pressing. The politicization of 
xenophobia in South Africa results in the privileging of immigrants in some sense 
through their victimization.  
 The anticipation of increased cross-border migration is apparent from 
Posel’s observation, that there was a shift in research to emphasize cross-border 
immigrations.57  Precisely why this observation is so important is because it 
superbly displays the pervasiveness of political assumptions in South Africa. 
South Africa’s triumphs have been accomplished through political means, and 
while the Apartheid regime was certainly political it was also about aggressively 
regulating movement and controlling urbanization. However, political 
assumptions have allowed South Africans to take for granted the repeal of pass 
laws and the Native Land Act 58 , which shaped settlement patterns in 
contemporary South Africa. Furthermore, to append more complexity into this 
discussion the homeland system of the apartheid era59 was intended to maintain 
a fragmented South Africa, and many rural South Africans continue to reside the 
designated areas. Therefore, again, there have been few improvements in the 
lives of South Africans with the granting of rights, and this is largely due to the 
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reification of the political assumption that there is direct causation between 









































	   	   	  













 In the first chapter of this inquiry, I briefly discussed the ‘paradox of 
democratization’ and the way in which democratization and the endowing of 
‘rights’ in South Africa has resulted in the development of political assumptions 
about how society should be. However, these political assumptions have 
successfully obscured social realities. What would a solution look like to this 
problem? One potential approach to reconcile the idealism of democratization 
and the social realities of the people is the ‘right to the city’ concept.  
 The ‘right to the city’ concept has evolved over the years; it was first 
proposed by the theorist Henri Lefebvre as a way to summon the importance of 
making the resources of urban areas more accessible. Moreover, in recent years, 
urban anthropologist and theorist David Harvey re-conceptualized the ‘right to the 
city’ as: 
“The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access 
urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by the changing 
city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since 
this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a 
collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The 
freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to 
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argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human 
rights.”60 
 
Harvey’s conception of the ‘right to the city’ is proposing that accessing the 
resources of the city is not simply an issue of being able to extract things from the 
city; instead, it must be about what he terms “remaking” the city or contributing to 
the city both as a space and an idea. The urbanization process of South Africa 
has for far too long excluded the native African population and it continues to do 
so. Until participating in the further development of the city is an opportunity 
provided to African natives in South Africa, the spatial oppression of Blacks will 
persist.  
 It was apparent in my own experiences in Johannesburg in 2010 that the 
cityscape was a space for wealthy tourist (due to the 2010 World Cup), white 
(mostly British) South Africans, and the diminutive Black elite population. Just 
prior to the World Cup there was an initiative to “clean up the streets” of 
Johannesburg, in which the homeless were removed from the streets and sent to 
remote settlements. I personally do not have the answer for what it will take to 
remake the city, but there must be further investigation into how these social 
realities can be reconciled with the idealism of Human Rights and 
Democratization. The problem of South Africa’s immigrant focus is that alleviating 
widespread deprivation of many South African citizens becomes a secondary 
concern, and ostensibly those for whom the anti-Apartheid movement sacrificed 
so much are left just making it. 
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